War in Our Times How Indian Army gave Chinese PLA a bloody nose at Nathu La and Cho La in 1967

It was exactly five years after the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in North-East Frontier Agency and Ladakh that the Indian Army redeemed itself by giving the People’s Liberation Army and Border Guards a bloody nose at Nathu La and Cho La. In September 1967, clashes between the PLA and the Indian Army across two high-altitude passes in Sikkim – Nathu La and Cho La (15,000 feet) – left hundreds of dead on both sides. It was the first time since the 1962 war that the two nations had exchanged artillery fire. Notwithstanding the clash at Galwan in 2020 and the clashes at Tulung La in 1975, the 1967 clashes remain the most violent exchange of fire in what has turned out to be an intriguing military standoff between the two large Asian neighbours and rising powers.
Nathu La skirmish
The likely trigger for the Nathu La and Cho La clashes was the political situation in Sikkim at the time. The state visit of the Chogyal and his American wife to India in September 1967 led the Chinese to believe that the unpopular monarch had decided to cosy up to the Indians to consolidate his position in return for abdicating more powers to the Indian State. Much in conformity with Chinese ambiguity and the lack of any official accounts, it is still difficult to ascertain if the skirmishes took place because two aggressive local commanders were responding to an evolving tactical situation on ground. Or was the Chinese aggression a part of Mao’s coercive signalling strategy?
Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora had recently taken over command of 33 Corps and had under his command 17 Division which was entrusted with the defence of large parts of Sikkim including what was and is still called the ‘Nathu La Complex.’ Comprising the passes of Nathu La, Cho La and Sabu La, Major General Sagat Singh was the divisional commander of 17 Mountain Division and knew his area of operation like the back of his hand. The entire complex was under 112 Mountain Brigade, which was commanded by an armoured corps officer, Brigadier M.M.S. Bakshi, a Maha Vir Chakra awardee from the 1965 war. Nathu La was defended by the 2nd Battalion the Grenadiers Regiment (2 GRENADIERS) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rai Singh, while Cho La was held by the 5th Battalion of the 11 Gorkha Rifles (5/11 GORKHA RIFLES) and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel K.B. Joshi. Across the border opposite 17 Division was the PLA’s 11 Division. PLA intrusions increased in late July 1967, prompting the move of an additional battalion,18th Battalion of the Rajput Regiment (18 RAJPUT), to Nathu La in August.
Escalation and firefight
As things began to heat up around early September 1967, Bakshi decided to fence the area south from Nathu La towards Sabu La along the LAC. This decision resulted in a series of heated exchanges between the English-speaking political commissar of the PLA and Colonel Rai Singh. The tipping point for the crisis came on 11 September in a round of pushing and shoving in which the commissar was allegedly roughed up by Indian soldiers. The PLA quietly withdrew after the scuffle and the Indian fence-laying party of 70 Engineer Regiment, continued their fencing operation along with 18 RAJPUT. Soon after, the PLA opened fire with MMGs accompanied by mortar and artillery fire, inflicting about forty casualties on the Indians. Rai was injured and two young officers were killed in action while rallying the troops. It took a while for the Indians to calibrate a suitable response. In the ensuing riposte, scores of PLA soldiers are said to have been killed by well-directed Indian artillery fire, which blasted Chinese bunkers and silenced MMGs in a display of outstanding gunnery. Clearly, the PLA – which had stunned and shocked the Indian forward defensive line in all the sectors in 1962 with a professional display of gunnery – had received a taste of its own medicine.
P.K. Roy, an Indian reporter for the Baltimore Sun, wrote quite disparagingly about the fitness and preparedness of the PLA soldiers as compared to their Indian adversaries. He observed that the Chinese 11 Division was stationed near Nathu La, but most of the Chinese soldiers seemed to be less acclimatised in the high altitude than the Indians. Chinese soldiers had been seen gasping while climbing. The impact of good leadership, fitness and morale of the Indian troops at Nathu La was telling, as was the decision to surprise the Chinese with artillery fire.
On 12 September, an Indian overture for a ceasefire was rejected by the PLA and fierce artillery duels raged for the next two days. When the Indian Army did not back off nor blink, the PLA stopped firing on 14 September and sought a flag meeting to diffuse tensions.
Action at Cho La
Two weeks later, in a concerted attempt to hit back after the reverse at Nathu La, the PLA attempted to overrun another Indian position at Cho La – which was the highest pass on the Sikkim–Tibet border located at a height of over 15,000 feet. By then, the Indian Army had reinforced its defensive positions with crack paratroopers who along with the determined Gorkhas used their positional advantage to push the PLA three kilometres back with effective mortar and field artillery support.
The Chinese threat to bring the PLA Air Force into the fray was completely discounted by India’s operational planners. This was because the military airfields in Tibet could hardly support the launch and recovery of fighters and bombers that could effectively interdict Indian positions. However, Indian fighters (MiG-21s and Gnats) and fighter-bombers (Hunters) could easily operate from the Bagdogra Airfield in West Bengal. They could reach their target areas around Nathu La within thirteen to fifteen minutes to provide air defence or attack PLA positions. An IAF Canberra photo reconnaissance aircraft from 106 Squadron in Agra did carry out a few missions over the area to ascertain the Chinese build-up. Though there is no archival record either in the PLA Air Force or IAF to suggest that any kind of aerial flareup was expected, IAF fighter squadrons were ready to intervene in case the need arose.
The big picture
India’s politico-military leadership of the time demonstrated great self-assurance during the skirmishes. As the firing peaked on 14 September, Lt General Manekshaw, the Eastern Army Commander, Aurora and Sagat Singh visited the scene of battle. This gave much cheer and confidence to the Indian troops, whose morale had remained high through the skirmish despite the loss of two officers and the wounding of a battalion commander. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made her first major public statement about the skirmish only after the Cho La incident on 1 October. In Mumbai, she said that she “hoped that it would only prove to be a local affair like the previous exchange at Nathu La”. She also went ahead with her plans to visit Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) even as the Defence Minister Swaran Singh, and the Chief of Army Staff, General P.P. Kumaramangalam, continued their official visits to Moscow and France respectively. Clearly, all of them had immense confidence in Manekshaw and his generals.
Notwithstanding the robust response, an all-round analysis of India’s defence preparedness was undertaken within its military and strategic establishment. There was a realisation that India would never be able to confront the Chinese on equal terms if it had to defend a border with too many forward positions. From the divisional headquarters at Gangtok (6,000 feet), it is an arduous drive of several hours followed by a climb of 8,000 feet to reach Nathu La. The PLA faced no such challenges, as its divisional HQ opposite Nathu La was located on a plateau and connected to forward locations by a network of steel-top roads. However, the Indian positions in the Nathu La sector were well-fortified and had adequate fire support; they were also logistically well-stocked, and proved to be more than just a numerical match for the PLA forces.
Several Western newspapers including the New York Times praised India for its firm stand at Nathu La in what it described as a ‘Himalayan street fight’. In a telling assessment of the larger strategic picture, the paper also highlighted that in their military and diplomatic posture, the Indians sought to reflect firmness and restraint. Emphasising this, Joseph Lelyveld – better known for his controversial biography of Mahatma Gandhi, ‘Great Soul’ wrote, “This was not just posturing. In 1962, when they were woefully underprepared to meet the Chinese, they engaged in a good deal of braggadocio; the Chinese ruthlessly made them eat their words. This time, after five years of building up their Himalayan defences, the Indians felt no need for brave words.”
The writer is a fighter pilot from the IAF and an accomplished military historian. He is the author of two defining books on contemporary Indian military history, ‘India’s Wars: A Military History 1947-1971′ and ‘Full Spectrum: India’s Wars 1972-2020’. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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